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Chapter 6 Education and the Virtues 
Mike Higton  
For universities to be seats of learning they must be schools of 
virtue. This is a necessary condition for their work, if they are in any 
way committed to the exploration of truth for the sake of the common 
good. 
My exploration of this claim will begin with an explicitly 
theological account of learning, drawn from a passage in the epistle to 
the Ephesians that connects ‘learning Christ’ to a set of deep 
behavioural dispositions – the kind of dispositions that are named 
elsewhere in scripture as the fruit of the Holy Spirit. This connection 
between Christian learning and the fruit of the Spirit is, I will suggest, 
echoed in a relationship already widely acknowledged in discussions 
of higher education: the relationship between university learning and 
virtue. I will argue that Christians might therefore have a role to play, 
alongside others, in defending and promoting the virtues necessary to 
learning: the virtues that sustain engagement with the world and with 
other learners. I also argue, however, that we should not imagine that 
universities have ever achieved a settled embodiment of virtue, nor see 
Christians simply as defenders or promoters of patterns of virtuous 
practice already securely understood and possessed. Rather, the 
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virtuous practices needed for good university learning are still in the 
process of being discovered, and Christian participants in university 
life need to be teachable participants in the quest for more virtuous 
learning. 
Learning Christ 
Now this I affirm and insist on in the Lord: you must no longer 
live as the Gentiles live, in the futility of their minds. They are 
darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God 
because of their ignorance and hardness of heart. They have 
lost all sensitivity and have abandoned themselves to 
licentiousness, greedy to practise every kind of impurity. 
That is not the way you learned Christ! For surely you have 
heard about him and were taught in him, as truth is in Jesus. 
You were taught to put away your former way of life, your old 
self, corrupt and deluded by its lusts, and to be renewed in the 
spirit of your minds, and to clothe yourselves with the new self, 
created according to the likeness of God in true righteousness 
and holiness. 
Ephesians 4:17–24 (NRSV) 
In this passage from Ephesians, understanding and living go 
together. The ‘Gentiles’ live badly because they understand badly; 
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their disordered minds are incapable of guiding well-ordered lives. To 
live well requires well-ordered understanding, and well-ordered 
understanding involves a transformation of the self. It demands a 
purification of disordered desires, a change in pattern of life from 
impurity to holiness, a taking off of the old self and a putting on of a 
new. 
The old way of life, precisely insofar as it is driven by 
misdirected desire, is a life bound to misunderstanding. It is a life in 
which understanding is yoked to gratification, and so to delusion – 
because our responsibilities and opportunities can only appear in 
distorted form when viewed through the filter of the old self’s avarice. 
The possibilities open to the old self are drastically limited, narrowed 
down to a blunt calculus of cost and benefit, insensitive to anything 
that does not tip the balance of that calculation. To live in this way is to 
live with a darkened mind: a mind almost blind, because it has such a 
dim light by which to see. It is also to live with a futile mind, a mind 
left purposeless because it cannot make sense of the world against any 
horizon more distant than its own passing wishes. This is 
understanding alienated from God, the ‘Father of all, who is above all 
and through all and in all’, the one truly righteous and holy. 
True understanding involves the overcoming of this alienation 
from the life of God. It is inseparable from holiness because it involves 
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purification of vision from gratification’s myopia, and learning to see 
as God sees. It is inseparable from righteousness because it learns to 
see justly – to do justice to what it sees. It demands everything of those 
who would learn it, because it demands the painful stripping away of 
their old habits of mind: dying to the old self and rising to the new. The 
way to renewal of mind is the way of cross and resurrection, the way 
of Jesus Christ. It is under his tutelage that Christians are being taught 
to see afresh, as they are being reunited in him to the life of God. They 
learn about him, and they are taught in him; the passage from old self 
to new, from delusion to the renewal of their minds, takes place as they 
learn Christ. 
The pursuit of understanding in the likeness of God does not, 
however, lead to a ‘God’s-eye view’, possessed in grand isolation by 
an individual knower. It is a form of understanding that cannot be 
pursued alone, as the epistle had indicated a few verses earlier: 
There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the 
one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one 
God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in 
all. But each of us was given grace according to the measure of 
Christ’s gift…. The gifts he gave were that some would be 
apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and 
teachers, to equip the saints for the work of ministry, for 
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building up the body of Christ, until all of us come to the unity 
of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to 
maturity, to the measure of the full stature of Christ. We must 
no longer be children, tossed to and fro and blown about by 
every wind of doctrine, by people’s trickery, by their craftiness 
in deceitful scheming. But speaking the truth in love, we must 
grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ, 
from whom the whole body, joined and knitted together by 
every ligament with which it is equipped, as each part is 
working properly, promotes the body’s growth in building itself 
up in love. 
Ephesians 4: 4–7, 11–16 
Learning Christ – walking on the way of Christ, and growing 
up into the full stature of Christ – involves becoming the body of 
Christ. This learning takes place as each person learns to play a 
distinctive role within the body. Each person has received a distinctive 
gift and becomes a distinctive gift to the whole. And that does not 
mean that each person is apportioned one fixed duty, being assigned to 
a single category in some divine team-building exercise. Rather, each 
is given a gift ‘according to the measure of Christ’s gift’, and that 
measure, ‘the measure of the full stature of Christ’, is one of unstinting 
abundance, into which the members of the body grow together. Each 
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member learns to understand more and to give more to the body, the 
more that he or she receives from others in the body. 
To come to the full stature of Christ, each person must 
therefore learn to receive and to go on receiving the gifts of 
others, which means learning to avoid any teaching (any ‘wind of 
doctrine’) that prevents such learning: any teaching that shows us only 
how this community might grow according to some faction’s pre-
conceived scheme. Learning to recognize and to receive the gifts of 
others, and to discover together the life that all can share, means 
learning to receive a life that no individual or faction owns, that comes 
to them all (and keeps coming to them all) as a gift from above: the gift 
of a steady enlargement of their capacity to live together in love. 
Growing into God’s understanding means unending reception of 
understanding from others, and through them from Christ, not the 
possession of a perspective from which to see and judge all. 
The body’s growth into the life of understanding requires each 
member to speak the truth in love, where the truth in question is 
precisely the yield of an undarkened vision, a renewed mind, capable 
of seeing justly. It requires each member to speak from the mind that is 
growing in her or him with the putting off of the old self and the 
putting on of the new. To speak the truth in love is to speak in ways 
that reveal possibilities of mutual service, of ministration to one 
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another’s needs within this body. This does not mean, however, that 
‘truth’ is simply a name for whatever is serviceable to this community, 
whatever promotes its unity and security over against the ‘Gentiles’ 
from which it has separated itself. This body is called to become a 
body by growing upwards, into Christ, who himself comes down to us 
from the God and Father of all. The ‘all of us’ who are called to the 
unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God cannot, 
finally, be smaller in scope than the ‘all’ who have God as Father. And 
the truth that the members of the body are called to see and speak is the 
truth of how this whole family of God might live as one in Christ. The 
members of Christ’s body are therefore called to grow to maturity as 
members of a family without boundaries: a truly universal community 
of all the children of God. Christian learning is therefore learning 
against a horizon of hope: hope of the salvation, the inclusion in this 
learning community, of the whole of God’s family.  
‘Learning Christ’ therefore includes within it learning to 
understand each other. It involves an on-going commitment to learn 
together, giving and receiving from each other deeper understanding of 
the possibilities for just, holy and loving life together. 
It is because learning has this goal and shape that learners must 
have a particular character. 
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I therefore, the prisoner in the Lord, beg you to lead a life 
worthy of the calling to which you have been called, with all 
humility and gentleness, with patience, bearing with one 
another in love, making every effort to maintain the unity of the 
Spirit in the bond of peace. 
Ephesians 4:1–3 
So then, putting away falsehood, let all of us speak the truth to 
our neighbours, for we are members of one another. Be angry 
but do not sin; do not let the sun go down on your anger, and 
do not make room for the devil…. Let no evil talk come out of 
your mouths, but only what is useful for building up, as there is 
need, so that your words may give grace to those who hear…. 
Put away from you all bitterness and wrath and anger and 
wrangling and slander, together with all malice, and be kind to 
one another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, as God in 
Christ has forgiven you. 
Ephesians 4: 25–27, 29, 31–2 
Given the nature of the learning to which the members of the 
Body of Christ are called, these characteristics, the fruit of the Spirit 
who is leading them into maturity, are necessary features of their life. 
Without these fruits, there can be no real learning: no reception of the 
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gift of truth from others, no seeing past the filters of one’s own desires, 
no discovery of ways to live together beyond factionalism. They are 
the characteristics of a learning life: learning demands holiness, the 
fruit of the Holy Spirit. 
Learning Christ and University Learning 
The gap between this theological vision of learning and 
learning as the business of universities (including avowedly secular 
universities) may seem large, but we can narrow it quite quickly. 
To narrow the gap from the theological side, we can note that 
‘learning Christ’ as set out in Ephesians must include all kinds of 
learning. The God of whom Ephesians speaks is the ‘one God and 
Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all’. This God is 
creator of the heavens and the earth, and so it is not just the whole 
human family but the whole community of God’s creation, the whole 
community that waits for redemption with eager longing, that is called 
into flourishing life together. Christians are called to live well with 
their fellow human beings, with the wider circle of non-human 
animals, as participants in the ecology of all living things, and as parts 
of God’s material creation. The understanding that can be darkened or 
enlightened, that is transformed on the way of the cross and of 
resurrection, and that is involved in ‘learning Christ’, therefore 
includes the understanding of any object whatsoever, if understanding 
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that object can affect how the learner lives in the world as God’s 
creature. It includes any learning that can shape learners’ 
understanding of the possibilities for or constraints upon their life in 
the world. 
To narrow the gap from the university side, one need simply 
note that university learning does indeed shape learners’ ways of 
inhabiting the world, and their ways of living together, and that at least 
some of the forms of learning pursued in a university allow for the 
present projects and expectations of learners to be interrupted, 
complicated, or derailed by what they learn. Where learning like this 
takes place, there is at least a possibility that learning can undercut 
gratification. To put it another way: the gap is narrowed just to the 
extent that universities are institutions concerned not simply with what 
is useful but with what is true (even if their concern is primarily with 
what is useful because it is true). 
Of course, the name ‘university’ has always named a variety of 
kinds of institution, and that variety has increased in recent decades. 
Universities speak about their learning, and pursue it, in a wide variety 
of ways. My claim about the proximity of learning Christ and 
university learning can cut through much of this diversity, however. It 
works with any university just insofar as its students are led to engage, 
alongside staff, in constructing, testing, and refining patterns of 
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understanding by engaging with the realities that those patterns purport 
to describe. And it works just to the extent that they are interested in 
exploring, by means of this constructing, testing and refining of 
patterns of understanding, how we might live well with the objects of 
our inquiries. 
University learning that allows this kind of engagement will 
tend to be characterised by the following features. First, the objects of 
its learning will seldom be done with. They will become the focuses of 
on-going exploration in which new possibilities of response are 
proposed, tested, refined, abandoned, replaced, and supplemented. 
Learners will go on examining the patterns of language and practice 
with which they surround these object, and by which they demarcate it 
as an object of study in the first place, and they will ask what forms of 
engagement they enable and what forms they obscure. And at least 
some of the time they will ask whose interests are involved in these 
patterns of language and practice. 
The gap will be at its narrowest wherever it is recognised that 
the possibilities of ‘living with’ and ‘responding to’ the objects of our 
learning are not reducible to consumption or exploitation. University 
learning that allows the objects of study to question and disrupt 
existing projects needs to be open to a wider range of possibilities – to 
relationships with those objects that can include wonder and lament as 
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well as use, and that can together take the form of wisdom (see Higton 
2013). 
This idea that university learning has to do with exploring the 
possibilities of life in the world might seem, at first sight, most clearly 
applicable wherever universities are concerned with objects of study 
directly ingredient in that life. It is easier to talk this way about 
investigation of the role of tree planting in the regulation of floodplains 
or the impact of foreign aid on commodity prices, than it is when 
universities are investigating the properties of gauge bosons, algebraic 
number theory, or the folding of cytoskeletal proteins – but one can 
still think of all of these forms of learning together as bound up in our 
inhabitation of the world and exploration of its possibilities, however 
limited a role might be played within that by specific domains of 
inquiry. 
The gap between my theological account of learning and 
university learning is likely to look smallest, however, when the 
‘objects’ of our investigation are animals, especially human animals, 
and the question about how we appropriately live with and respond to 
them has becomes the question of how we can live together. The 
questions asked in universities about the patterns of language and 
practice by which we navigate our relationships with others can then 
(at least in principle) become questions about the justice those patterns 
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do to the needs, experience, and integrity of other persons. We attend 
to the ways in which they appear (or have been made to disappear) 
within the discourses that shape our world, and we experiment with 
and test ways of making sense that we hope will do more justice. 
My claim is that whenever it can plausibly be thought of as 
involving this kind of labour on the ways in which we live in and with 
the world, university learning stands on terrain that, from a Christian 
theological point of view, is included in ‘learning Christ’. At its best, 
the learning that takes place in universities may therefore contribute, in 
however limited a way, to the task of learning to live together in the 
world as Christ’s body, regardless of whether those involved in it 
understand their learning in these terms. Of course, that qualifier ‘at its 
best’ is necessary, because nothing I have said requires that university 
learning will automatically lead to holy and righteous possibilities of 
living. My claim is certainly not that such university learning 
inherently or pervasively makes a positive contribution to learning 
Christ. Even if some of the forms of learning pursued in university 
settings look like they might contribute to flourishing life together, 
others might promote ways of living with creation, or of relating to 
others, that will look distorted to eyes being trained by the gospel, and 
there may be nothing in the resources of the university itself that can 
determine which of these possibilities will be realised. And if we ask at 
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the broadest level about the visions of the common good, the political 
telos that is avowed by university learners or implied in their practice, 
we might well find it difficult to make positive connections between 
most universities and a Christian vision of learning, and may even be 
tempted to portray some grand philosophical opposition between them. 
At a lower level, however, the level at which university learners 
engage with particular objects of study by means of specific forms of 
diligence and disciplined attention, the connections between this 
learning and ‘learning Christ’ will be more complex, and potentially 
more positive. 
My claim is not that Christian learning must build on university 
learning, nor that university learning can prepare for or produce 
Christian learning. I am not, in fact, claiming that there is any kind of 
systematic relationship between them. It is simply that, insofar as 
university learning explores the possibilities of life in the world, it is 
exploring territory that a Christian will see as relevant to ‘learning 
Christ’, and that it therefore makes sense for a Christian learner (a 
‘disciple’) to interrogate university learning in the light of a Christian 
vision of learning. Learning Christ and university learning are not 
incommensurable realities. 
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Virtue in the University 
When I set out a theological vision of learning above, I finished 
by arguing that the fruit of the Spirit are necessary features of learning. 
Without them, there can be no real learning; they are the characteristics 
of a learning life. People learn well by becoming those who learn with 
humility, gentleness, patience, forbearance, honesty, kindness, 
forgiveness, and the moderation of anger. 
One simple effect of examining university learning in the light 
of this theological vision, therefore, is to highlight the role that these 
fruit might play – must play – in university life. In itself, this is not a 
particularly striking move, despite the fact that references to the fruit of 
the Spirit are predictably sparse in secular discussions of Higher 
Education policy and practice. References to ‘virtue’, which covers at 
least some of the same territory, are widespread. The term ‘virtue’ is 
not, of course, identical to the term ‘fruit of the Spirit’, but it still 
directs our attention to the deep dispositions of the learner that enable 
and shape learning. At its most neutral, of course, the term ‘virtue’ 
simply names the internalisation by students and staff of the standards 
of excellence appropriate to the practices pursued in university: 
learning, teaching, and research. Normally, however, it is given a more 
decidedly ethical cast: it is used to talk about these internalised 
standards insofar as they are constituents of a good human life, or 
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insofar as the practices they govern are contributions to the common 
good. 
It is not uncommon, then, to see university learning presented 
as a matter of virtue, and the university itself as a school of virtue, even 
if the accounts of virtue involved vary widely (see, for example, Nixon 
2008; Koetzee 2014.) University learning is seen to involve the 
disciplining of our existing patterns of thinking by engagement with 
the reality they purport to describe. Such disciplining of our thinking 
demands attentiveness of us; it demands that we be open to surprise, 
with a readiness to notice facets of that reality that do not fit our 
expectations. It involves the patience required to allow those facets to 
emerge. It requires the honesty to admit the challenges created by these 
surprises for our existing thinking, the integrity to trace their 
implications as far as necessary through the whole pattern of that 
thinking, and the clarity that makes the tracing of those connections 
possible. It involves the humility involved both in admitting that 
changes to our thinking are necessary and in the communication of 
those changes. At times it requires the courage to admit that one has 
been wrong. Yet it also involves confidence in what one has learnt, and 
the willingness to trust the findings to which disciplined investigation 
has led one, even when that means contradicting others. 
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It is also unexceptional to suggest that learning involves the 
formation of communities within which these virtues are formed and 
sustained. University learning involves patterns of relationship within 
which certain kinds of give and take, certain kinds of mutual 
affirmation and critique, are enabled and encouraged. Participation in 
such a community involves taking responsibility for one’s 
contribution, responding to critiques of that contribution, and offering 
criticism in turn. It involves the maintenance of certain patterns of 
civility: the maintenance of conventions that permit and facilitate 
exchange. 
None of these claims is unusual in the literature on Higher 
Education, nor in the language of universities themselves, even where 
the term ‘virtue’ does not itself appear. Universities often speak about 
academic good conduct, where that covers everything from the 
acknowledgement of sources and the avoidance of misquotation to 
standards of clarity and proof. Most universities speak about these 
matters in ethical terms, and many connect them to the inherent nature 
of learning. Oxford University, for instance, provides the following 
guidance on plagiarism: 
Plagiarism is a breach of academic integrity. It is a principle of 
intellectual honesty that all members of the academic 
community should acknowledge their debt to the originators of 
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the ideas, words, and data which form the basis for their own 
work. Passing off another’s work as your own is not only poor 
scholarship, but also means that you have failed to complete the 
learning process. 
… You are not necessarily expected to become an original 
thinker, but you are expected to be an independent one – by 
learning to assess critically the work of others, weigh up 
differing arguments and draw your own conclusions. Students 
who plagiarise undermine the ethos of academic scholarship 
while avoiding an essential part of the learning process. 
(University of Oxford 2015) 
Similarly, it is not at all unusual to find standards of behaviour 
in research being overseen by ethics committees, or to find research 
conduct discussed in ethical terms. The Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC), for instance, insists that the ‘seven principles of 
public life’ (selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty, and leadership) are essential to the work of research 
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assessment, and includes discussion of them in training for members of 
its Peer Review College (AHRC 2015).1 
There is, of course, plenty of scope for criticism of the ways in 
which these ideas are articulated, and of the forms of education and of 
scrutiny by which the virtues named are supposedly inculcated, just as 
there is plenty of scope for negative judgments about the actual display 
of these virtues in academic life. There is, nevertheless, much here that 
can be affirmed from a theological point of view. Christians can 
broadly agree with many others that the universities we need have to 
be virtuous universities, because learning demands of learners patient 
and disciplined engagement with the world and honest and open 
engagement with one another. 
Can Virtue Be Taught? 
From a theological point of view, then, there is a certain 
proximity between university learning and ‘learning Christ’, and the 
theologian’s interest in the role of the fruit of the Spirit in learning is 
matched by an interest on the university side in the virtues necessary to 
learning. Christian observers of and participants in university life 
should have a particular interest in this dimension of university 
                                                   
1 These are the ‘Nolan Principles’, published in 1995 by the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life. 
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learning. They should be amongst those taking seriously the 
description of university learning as a matter of formation in virtue, in 
ways that go beyond the formalities of ‘academic good conduct’ and 
compliance with codes of ethics. 
Looking at the university with theological eyes, however, will 
involve more than a simple affirmation of existing ways of speaking 
about and pursuing the formation of educational virtues. Within a 
theological vision, the learning pursued in universities, and the virtues 
developed in that pursuit, are situated within a broader narrative. They 
are good to the extent that they can be contributions to the deep 
transformation of the self from gratification to righteousness, and 
contributions to the formation of the just and loving community of all 
God’s children. 
Because they see the development of the virtues necessary to 
learning as, potentially, a limited but real contribution to the deep 
transformation of the self, Christians may be particularly aware of 
some of the difficulties involved. ‘Quarry the granite rock with razors,’ 
said John Henry Newman, ‘or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; 
then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human 
knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the 
passion and the pride of man’ (Newman 1976: p.111). After all, the 
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possibility of teaching virtue has been called into question since at 
least the time of Socrates. 
In part, this question has to do with the futility of the direct 
teaching of virtue. After all, teaching about virtue does not inculcate it, 
and there are good reasons to be sceptical about the value of direct 
attempts to train university students and staff in virtue. A focus on 
distinct ethics courses, or on the provision of ever more comprehensive 
information about good practice is very unlikely to be the main yield of 
a serious focus on virtue. Even a cursory glance at the theological and 
philosophical literature on virtue is enough to suggest that the focus is 
far more likely to fall on teachers and mentors modelling, habitually 
and attractively, the forms of attentiveness, openness and integrity, that 
their disciplines demand, and drawing – or seeking to draw – their 
students into the community of those for whom these virtues have 
become second nature. Virtues are, it seems, best caught by imitation 
and repetition, by involvement in a community for which they have 
become second nature. A Christian concern with virtue in universities 
might, therefore, take the form of a concern with the kinds of 
apprenticeship in virtuous learning that the university provides, and 
with the dynamics of classrooms and labs as communities of 
apprenticeship. The universities we need are schools of apprenticeship: 
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contexts for the formation of relationships that allow for imitation of 
the habits of attentiveness and communication that constitute learning. 
There is another aspect to the difficulty of teaching virtue, 
however, which goes rather deeper. Virtue cannot be taught, the 
argument goes, because to learn virtue requires that one already 
recognise and value it, and that in turn requires one to have already 
internalised the virtue that one is supposed to be learning. In reality, of 
course, the patterns of learning can be rather more complex than this 
criticism suggests. One can imagine, for instance, someone motivated 
by a thoroughly instrumental desire for some of the extrinsic goods 
made possible by a university education (salary enhancement, say), 
and diligently pursuing his or her studies only for the sake of those 
goods – and yet getting caught up in the process of study almost 
despite themselves, and beginning to value it for its own sake. Such a 
person might well learn the intellectual virtues necessary for their 
studies, and come in time to internalise them so that they became 
second nature, and properly deserving of the name ‘virtue’. 
Nevertheless, the claim that virtue cannot be taught to the 
unvirtuous rightly suggests that universities as putative schools of 
virtue cannot be considered in isolation from other contexts of virtuous 
learning. Students arrive at university already formed in many ways (in 
families, schools, churches, as participants in and consumers of 
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popular culture, and so on); they are normally at university for only a 
short period of time. As Stanley Hauerwas (2007) has argued, a society 
therefore tends to get the universities that it deserves: the formation 
provided by a university can only be sustainable and effective if it is 
one that those in the society surrounding it are able to value. 
Universities can only provide formation that makes sense within those 
broader patterns of moral education that shape that society. A Christian 
concern with virtue in universities might therefore take the form of a 
concern with the connections between the university and the wider 
society, and even though there is no good reason to think that the wider 
society will be unvaryingly inimical to the possibility of true learning, 
that concern might include a particular focus on the kinds of moral 
formation outside the university that undermine the possibility of good 
work within it, and on the possibilities within university life for 
resisting and undoing them. Just as theologians have asked about the 
counter-cultural possibilities of Christian liturgies over against the 
malformation provided by the quasi-liturgies of consumerism (for 
instance), so a Christian concerned with virtue in a university setting 
might ask whether here too there might be, in however secondary and 
limited a sense, liturgies of formation strong enough to keep the space 
for true learning open. The universities we need will be contexts for 
the formation of deep habits of attentiveness and communication, and 
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such formation will be a matter of the whole performance, display and 
ritual of university life. 
There can, after all, be a specificity to the education in virtue 
provided by universities, precisely because virtues can take domain-
specific forms. It is possible to be habitually honest in one domain and 
not in another, habitually attentive in one domain and not in another, 
habitually to show integrity of one kind but not of another. That is not 
to say that the various domain-specific forms of honesty, say, are 
completely independent – and it might therefore be sensible to ask 
serious questions about the academic honesty of someone who had 
proved thoroughly dishonest in some other context – but formation in 
virtue might indeed turn out to be a complex patchwork affair rather 
than a coherent whole. That should certainly make us wary of any 
claims that university learning will inherently have some wider 
moralising effect, beyond forming students in the virtues necessary for 
that learning itself, but it does also suggest that specific forms of 
virtuous behaviour may be kept alive in a university, by the momentum 
of its own particular practices, in ways that are effectively counter-
cultural. Academic communities might be communities of virtue in 
ways that do not reflect, and might even resist, wider societal patterns 
– even if only in limited ways. A Christian concern with virtue in 
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universities might take the form of an interest in these counter-cultural 
possibilities that university learning can provide. 
Negotiating Virtue 
All of these suggestions, however, could leave a problematic 
picture in place. They could reinforce the assumption that the shape of 
the virtuous practices necessary for university learning to flourish is 
clear, that Christians have (either uniquely, or alongside others) a 
secure grasp of that shape, and that their task is therefore simply one of 
the preservation or promotion of something that they possess. Yet in 
the theological vision with which I began, the fruits of the Spirit were 
the dispositions necessary for an on-going exchange, in which the 
members of the body keep on giving and receiving from one another 
new understanding of the possibilities for living together – in which 
they keep on learning the nature of the life to which they are called. 
The life discovered in these exchanges is, I said, one that no individual 
or faction owns, and that comes to them all (and keeps coming to them 
all) as a gift from above. It involves an unending reception of 
understanding from others, and through them from Christ, rather than 
the possession of a perspective from which to see and judge all. To 
promote such a life by acting as guardians of a conception of virtue 
already securely possessed would involve a performative contradiction 
– and it might be better to think that one of the roles that Christian 
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participants could play in university life would be to be visibly 
teachable. 
Rather than thinking of, say, ‘openness’ as a virtue that is 
already securely identified, that can be preserved or promoted by 
means of appropriate vigilance, we should instead think of it as a 
vague term that is concretely, repeatedly and diversely specified in 
particular proposals and counter-proposals for patterns of university 
life. We should think of it as a site for on-going negotiation, and 
therefore as a site for on-going learning. We already know something 
of what it means to be open, and to be formed for openness, but we do 
not yet know all that openness can and should mean. After all, I argued 
above that the openness proper to learning has as its horizon the whole 
human family learning together. 
This vision of an on-going mutual adjustment finds its echoes 
in the life of contemporary universities. They are often locations where 
the openness or inclusivity of learning is a matter of intense and 
difficult negotiation. Universities are often depicted in the press and 
elsewhere as seedbeds of ‘political correctness’, but that normally 
means no more than that they are sites for the sometimes awkward, 
sometimes heated attempt to identify the forms of exclusion prevalent 
in our society and mirrored in our society’s universities, and to track 
down the roots those forms of exclusion through all our practices and 
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our language. Such negotiation – genuinely difficult, genuinely 
contested, and inherently resistant to resolution by simple appeals to 
supposed common sense – is not a distraction from the proper business 
of universities, but an inevitable and proper accompaniment to 
learning. It is a symptom of the on-going exploration of the nature of 
one of the core virtues proper to learning. 
One could look, therefore, at recent debates about the ‘no 
platforming’ of controversial speakers, the removal from college 
facades of statues of infamous figures from the colonial past, the 
proper approach to avoiding offensive stereotypes in student 
celebrations, or the need for trigger warnings before lectures that 
include sensitive content, and so on. The existence and fierceness of 
these debates are not signs of some fundamental breakdown in 
university life, still less of some easily dismissed immaturity on the 
part of students. They are evidence of the on-going, complex 
negotiation of the openness of the university learning community. 
They are new forms of fundamental and perennial questions facing 
universities, precisely about the kind of moral formation they demand 
and provide – and those perennial questions can always throw up new 
forms. 
Precisely the patterns of virtuous behaviour on which the 
academic community has collectively settled can turn out, in 
 28 
subsequent negotiations, to be or to have become forms of viciousness 
that need to be overcome. The forms of civility that permit and 
facilitate exchange, for instance, can be masks for very uneven 
distributions of power. They can all too easily serve to mute challenges 
that ought to be heard. Even the call for clarity as an intellectual virtue 
can be problematic in some contexts, where the language of learning 
has evolved as a home for those in power, and where those excluded 
from power are also excluded from the sense of easy familiarity, the 
sense of being at home in the language, that common forms of clarity 
demand. 
The theological vision of learning that I have outlined certainly 
encourages a deep concern with universities as schools of virtue, with 
the forms of apprenticeship that they provide, and with their 
connection with other patterns of moral formation in society. It should 
not, however, promote a concern that is predominantly conservative, 
still less nostalgic in tone. The universities that we need will be homes 
to an on-going negotiation of patterns of practice and formation, in 
which participants go on learning from one another, and from those not 
yet included, what virtue can and should look like. For Christian 
participants, there will certainly be a constant return to the gospel of 
Jesus Christ to test, challenge, and refine what is being learnt – the 
fundamental form of learning is, after all, ‘learning Christ’ – but 
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Christians can expect to discover more of that gospel in the light of the 
understanding they receive as a gift from others. 
In other words, participants in the universities we need will 
recognise that they, their disciplines, and their institutions are not yet 
virtuous, and that they do not yet know in full what virtuous learning 
will involve. They will recognise that there are new habits of 
attentiveness, of openness, and of critique to learn, and they will expect 
to go on learning them from others, and to be weaned, in the process, 
from habits of thought and action that they had hitherto thought to be 
good. 
For universities to be seats of learning they must be schools of 
virtue. To be schools of virtue, however, includes being places where 
our grasp of virtue is explored, challenged and revised. The 
universities that we need are not reservations in which the virtues of an 
imagined golden age are preserved, nor clubs within which a well 
understood rulebook of virtuous practices is enforced. They are sites 
for contestation and discovery, for the restless expansion of the 
community of enquiry, and for the on-going transformation of the 
habits of engagement and communication that make true learning 
possible. 
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